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Does Risk Explain Persistence in Private Equity Performance? 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper, we investigate whether fund-specific risk helps explain performance persistence in 
private equity funds, using detailed deal-level cash flow information at both the fund and deal 
levels. We further extend existing findings to international evidence on buyout and venture 
capital (VC) by testing the impact of various risk measures. We find that risk is an important 
driver of performance persistence and helps explain such persistence. We also find persistence 
in risk in private equity, in particular persistence in downside volatility for both buyout and VC 
funds. Finally, we document that fund performance is more strongly affected by fund managers 
able to minimize downside losses than selecting outperforming portfolio companies. This effect 
is strongest for buyout but, to a weaker extent, also holds for VC. Our results are further robust 
to controlling for legal factors at the country level.  
 
 
Keywords: private equity; performance; venture capital; buyout; risk; persistence 
JEL Classifications: G24; G23 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since Kaplan and Schoar ?Ɛ (2005) seminal article on fund performance persistence in US private 
equity (PE), several follow-up studies have investigated drivers of this persistence. For example, 
Harris, Jenkinson, Kaplan and Stucke (2014) find that performance persistence has largely 
disappeared in the buyout but not venture capital (VC) segment. In contrast, Korteweg and 
Sorensen (2014) find greater long-term persistence in buyout than in VC due to larger 
differences in skills among buyout fund managers. Cumming Dai, Hass and Schweizer (2012) 
even document performance persistence in the hedge fund industry, and that the level of 
persistence is affected by regulation. The question whether there is persistence in fund 
performance is important because it implies that some fund managers consistently outperform 
their peers over a longer period and, thus, that past performance is a good predictor of future 
performance.  
 This study contributes to this debate by examining whether fund-level risk can explain 
the observed persistence in performance of funds. Performance persistence might simply occur 
because fund managers consistently take on more risk than other fund managers, leading to 
persistence in risk. Fund managers who take high levels of risk would have persistently higher 
returns than their counterparts. Previous studies have not investigated this issue because of a 
lack of accurate deal-level data. However, Kaplan and Schoar (2005) recognized that risk might 
help explain persistence, but they could not investigate it further beyond examining potential 
differences across subsamples of fund asset classes to capture differences in risk between 
funds. Fund-level cash flows are indeed not appropriate for measuring risk, because there is a 
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strong cash flow pattern over time in the 10-year life cycle of private equity funds. This pattern 
occurs because cash flows are lower at the beginning and increase significantly toward the end. 
In contrast, we make use of deal-level cash flows, which allow us to calculate the volatility of the 
internal rates of return (IRRs) of the different deals to measure risk at the fund level. This 
approach helps us investigate the following research questions: do differences in risk explain 
the fund performance persistence puzzle in private equity? Moreover, in addition to 
performance persistence, can we observe persistence in risk over follow-up funds? More 
generally, is fund performance driven by managers able to consistently "minimize extreme 
losses" (i.e., downside volatility) or "select outperforming deals" (i.e., generate upside 
volatility)? Both effects affect performance, but in different ways. We investigate these research 
questions for VC and buyout funds located both in the United States and internationally. 
 In this paper, we use detailed deal-level and fund-level cash flow data coming from the 
Center for Private Equity Research (CEPRES) database. Our international sample covers 18,256 
unique investments in portfolio companies done by 769 VC and buyout funds during the 1980 W
2009 period. Slightly more than half the investments are realized (i.e., divested). Although 
portfolio companies are anonymized, the database enables linking portfolio companies to funds 
and funds to management firms. Previous versions of the data have been used by Franzoni, 
Nowak and Phalippou (2012) for buyout and Cumming, Schmidt, and Walz (2010), Cumming and 
Walz (2010) and Krohmer, Lauterbach, and Calanog (2009) for VC. In contrast, our sample 
covers a larger time span and both types of private equity (VC and buyout). Moreover, we make 
use of information at both the deal and fund levels.  
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 Our primary measure of risk is intra-fund volatility, which represents the standard 
deviation of IRRs of the different portfolio companies in which a fund has invested over its 
lifetime. This volatility is essentially a proxy for total investment risk of a fund. Using total risk 
seems somewhat unconventional given that standard asset pricing theory suggests that only 
systematic risk is priced in equilibrium. However, in contrast to this conventional view, the 
article from Ewens, Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2013) provides evidence that idiosyncratic risk is 
also a priced factor for private equity fund investments. Ewens, Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2013) 
develop a theoretical model to analyze the role of idiosyncratic risk for the pricing of private 
equity investments. Their model predicts a positive relationship between the investment 
returns of funds and the ex-ƉŽƐƚŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƚŝĐƌŝƐŬŽĨƚŚĞĨƵŶĚƐ ?ƌĞƚƵƌŶƐ ?ŵƉŝƌŝĐĂůůǇ, ƚŚĞǇĮŶĚĂ
strong correlation between realized total risk and fund returns. Based on this previous empirical 
evidence, it seems reasonable to use total risk as the appropriate measure of investment risk for 
private equity funds in this paper.  
 We further consider upward and downward intra-fund volatility to examine the impact 
of upside and downside risk on fund performance. This extension is motivated by the fact that 
private equity investments typically involve highly skewed investment returns that deviate 
substantially from a normal distribution. In this case, downside volatility is a more plausible 
measure of risk than variance because investors worry about under-performance rather than 
over-performance, as Markowitz (1991) suggests. Consistent with existing studies, we use the 
Public Market Equivalent (PME) ratio as our main measure of fund performance. PME uses a 
market index of similar risk to scale a fund's market value and thus is a risk-adjusted 
performance measure (i.e., adjusted for systematic risk but not total risk). Recent research by 
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Sorensen and Jagannathan (2015) and Korteweg and Nagel (2015) shows that the PME is a risk-
adjusted performance measure that can be derived under the assumption that investors have 
logarithmic utility functions. As a risk-adjusted measure of performance the PME should not be 
correlated with any measure of systematic or total fund risk. However, if PME is highly 
correlated with our measures of total risk (below, we will show that this is the case), then it is 
reasonable to include further controls for risk when using the PME to assess performance 
persistence. Our results, however, also hold for IRR, which is a measure of absolute returns. In 
other words, we examine the impact of total risk on fund performance, which is an appropriate 
measure for studying persistence in performance and risk.  
 We find that total fund risk is an important driver of performance in the US, even for 
risk-adjusted performance. We find no persistence in non-US funds. Total risk explains away the 
previously documented performance persistence for the US, especially for buyout funds. For US 
VC funds, performance persistence remains, while total fund risk is also a significant driver. 
Next, we find strong persistence in risk, consistent with the view that performance persistence 
goes hand in hand with persistence in risk. This finding offers an alternative and complementary 
explanation for performance persistence to the traditional one based on expertise. This 
relationship is again strongest for US funds. When evaluating downside and upside risk 
separately, we find that the impact of downside risk persistence is strongest for both buyout 
and VC funds, since upside volatility is generally not persistent after controlling for fund size.  
 Prompted by these findings, we next investigate whether fund performance is driven by 
a strategy of "minimizing extreme losses" or "generating outperforming ventures", an issue that 
is particularly important for VC. Indeed, fund managers may generate high performance for two 
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reasons: either because they are able to minimize total losses, notably by selecting targets that 
do not appear too risky, or because they are able to select the most promising firms in the 
industry and thereby ensure that at least one investment generates a very high return. In the 
first case, performance is high because downside risk is minimized; in the second case, 
performance is high because the fund has a "star" included in its portfolio (leading to higher 
upward volatility). Our analysis indicates that managing downside risk has the greatest impact 
on fund performance.  Consistent with our intuition, this finding is strongest for buyout funds, 
for which target companies are more mature and typically require corporate restructuring. For 
VC funds, the impact of upside risk is more important than for buyout funds, because VC 
investments are prone to more upside gains owing to the highly innovative and high-growth-
oriented firms in which VC funds invest.  
 Finally, we extend our analysis by examining the impact of legal conditions and fund-
level (managerial style) characteristics. Following extant literature (including La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998, Cumming and Knill, 2012, Cao, Cumming, Qian and Wang, 
2015, Cumming and Dai, 2010, Cumming, Dai, Hass, and Schweizer, 2012, and Cumming, Siegel 
and Wright, 2007), we find no evidence that our results are driven by these additional factors. In 
fact, we find no evidence that the broad measures of "law & finance" traditionally used in the 
literature affect persistence. 
 Our study contributes to the literature on fund performance in private equity.
1
 To the 
best of our knowledge, the only study that directly links fund performance to deal-level 
                                                          
1
 A different research question often addressed in this literature is whether private equity yields a premium over 
public equity (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Phalippou and Gottschalg, 2009; Harris, Jenkinson and Kaplan, 2014). This 
requires cash flows net of fees. We have cash flows gross of fees, so we do not address this question here. 
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characteristics is that by Braun, Jenkinson and Stoff (2013). However, they are unable to relate 
portfolio companies to specific funds so that they construct "synthetic funds" by bundling a 
series of sequential investments. In contrast with their approach, we are able to allocate every 
portfolio company investment to a specific fund, for which we also have detailed fund 
information. Thus, we have extensive information on management firms, funds and portfolio 
companies and can relate each company to a fund and each fund to a management firm. This 
allows us to construct precise measures of risk and extend our understanding using new 
information. Franzoni, Nowak and Phalippou (2012) examine a driver of abnormal returns (the 
"alpha") in private equity and find that it is explained by its liquidity risk premium. This result 
suggests that risk specific to private equity helps explain differences in returns between private 
and public equity. However, these authors do not examine persistence over time. 
 Marquez, Nanda and Yavuz (2014) offer a theoretical contribution into this literature by 
developing a model to explain why performance persistence is in equilibrium. They argue that 
top-performing fund managers may voluntarily limit fund size and fees to generate more value 
in the selected portfolio companies than other fund managers. As a result, funds of top-
performing managers become over-subscribed but also show persistence in performance. 
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: the next section describes the data, 
defines our risk measures used and presents our sample. Section 3 analyzes drivers of fund 
performance and the impact of risk on performance persistence. We further examine 
persistence in risk. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. DATA DESCRIPTION, RISK MEASURES AND SAMPLE COMPOSITION 
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2.1. Data Description 
We use data from the CEPRES database, which is unique in that it provides detailed information 
and cash flow data at deal and fund levels; other databases tend to provide data for private 
equity at either the fund level or the investment level only. CEPRES data are described in detail 
in Franzoni, Nowak and Phalippou (2012). Several studies have used the database, including 
Cumming, Schmidt and Walz (2010), Cumming and Walz (2010), Franzoni, Nowak and Phalippou 
(2012), and Krohmer, Lauterbach and Calanog (2009). 
Through its special data collection method (based on the so-called Private Equity 
Analyzer), CEPRES effectively anonymizes all information related to investments to meet the 
confidentiality requirements of the VC and PE firms that provide data to CEPRES. This means 
that third parties are not able to identify individual portfolio companies, funds or management 
firms. This is crucial and eliminates the incentives for management firms to overstate the results 
they report to CEPRES. Lack of anonymity in other databases may result in overstating, partial 
reporting and back-filling of information, amounting to positive self-reporting biases. We have 
details on 392 buyout funds that invested in 6,702 deals, 3,729 of which are fully realized deals. 
We also observe 377 VC funds that invested in 11,554 deals, 6,005 of which are fully realized 
deals. Our sample covers deals made during the period from January 1980 to the end of 2008, 
for which we have cash flow data until December 2009. All our variables are defined in 
Appendix Table 1. 
Figure 1 depicts the number of buyout and VC funds by vintage year. It shows that our 
sample is consistent with the general view that only a few VC and buyout funds were set up 
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during the 1980s and early 1990s compared with later years. Just before the dot.com bubble, 
the number of VC and buyout funds had almost doubled, as compared with the 1980 W1998 
period, and continued to increase during the bubble (especially VC funds). During the post-
bubble period, the number of funds established again declined significantly, but not as much as 
the number of funds established in the 1980s and early 1990s. Since the financial crises, only a 
few new VC and buyout funds have been raised, possibly because of unfavorable exit markets 
and lack of capital supply from capital-constrained institutional investors. 
 
[Please insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Table 1 reports for our sample the distribution of VC and buyout deals by investment 
year from 1980 through 2009. The sample is divided into buyout and VC funds and by US and 
non-US funds. The table shows that in the early 1980s, the number of deals was lower than that 
in the 1990s and 2000s. This is true for the buyout and VC deals and for deals done by US and 
non-US funds. For the US buyout, the number of deals realized was higher in the 1980s and 
1990s than those in the 2000s. The pattern is consistent for non-US buyout funds. For the VC 
funds, there were more realized deals in the 1980s and 1990s than in the 2000s in terms of 
numbers and proportions, consistent with the need for a longer investment period of several 
years in VC before an exit is possible. These results are not limited to US VC funds, but also non-
US VC funds. Although the number of investments has increased in the 2000s, the rate of 
realized deals has decreased proportionally as compared with 1980s and 1990s. As Table 1 
11 
 
shows, VC deals are more than twice the number of buyout deals, while for the US subsample, 
the VC deals are approximately three times the number of buyout deals.  
 
[Please insert Table 1 about here] 
 
2.2. Definition of Risk Measures 
To analyze whether differences in risk explain performance persistence, we construct several 
measures of risk for our sample of private equity funds. The first measure of risk is the Intra-
Fund Volatility of IRRs. For a fund that has invested in N portfolio companies with returns, as 
measured by the IRR, given by IRR1, IRR2,  ? ?/ZZN, this risk measure is calculated by 
,)(
1
1
1
2¦
 
 
N
i
i IRRIRRN
V  
where IRR is the mean rate of return of all the N investments made by the fund. This measure 
corresponds to the standard deviation of IRRs of individual investments made by the fund. It 
proxies for the variability or dispersion of the investment returns of a fund around the mean 
value. Thus, funds that take on high levels of investment risk, on average, display higher levels 
of intra-fund volatility than funds that take on low levels of risk. 
The intra-fund volatility presented previously is only a valid measure of risk a fund takes 
when returns are adequately captured by a normal distribution. The reason is that the intra-
fund volatility does not distinguish between variations below and above the mean. To account 
for the fact that private equity returns are typically highly skewed, we use two additional 
measures: intra-fund downside and upside volatility are modified versions of the intra-fund 
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volatility introduced previously that allow distinguishing between the different degrees of 
upside and downside variations in returns. The formal definition of Intra-Fund Downside 
Volatility of IRRs is
2
 
¦
 
 
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2)0;(min(1V .
 
The formal definition of the Intra-Fund Upside Volatility of IRRs is  
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In both equations, "Tar" denotes the return target. Similar to Ang, Chen and Xing (2006), we use 
a target return of zero in all the following calculations.  
 
2.3. Summary Statistics of Sample 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of different risk measures for the full sample, buyout 
and VC funds. We also report statistics for two related measures of return distribution: Loss 
Rate and Intra-Fund Skewness of IRRs. Loss Rate refers to the percentage of investments of a 
fund that lead to complete loss and thus generate an IRR of  W100%.  
 The mean (median) loss rate of funds is 8.46% (3.85%) for the full sample (all quartiles 
combined), while for buyout and VC separately, these values are 6.06% (0.00%) and 14.82% 
(13.04%), respectively. As expected, the probability of total loss is greater for VC than for 
buyout funds. The intra-fund volatility is high for the full sample of funds with mean (median) of 
                                                          
2
 In order to get an unbiased estimator, the standard deviation given above must be scaled by N-1. In contrast, up- 
and downside volatilities are typically defined by scaling by the sample size N.   
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101.22% (58.18%), while the value for buyout is 92.20% (57.99%) and for VC is 123.1% (69.76%). 
As indicated by the next two measures, the high intra-fund volatility is driven by the upside 
rather than the downside volatility. This observation is true for the buyout and VC funds. For 
example, the intra-fund downside volatility is 27.50% for the full sample compared with 97.21% 
for the intra-fund upside volatility. For the buyout, the downside volatility is 22.38% compared 
with 94.00% for the upside volatility. Similarly, for the VC, the downside volatility is 40.21% and 
the upside is 111.15%. The funds are positively skewed, especially for the VC funds, with a 
skewness of 1.62, compared with 0.89 for the buyout and 1.12 for the full sample.  
 Table 2 also shows how the risk measures differ between the first and fourth quartile 
funds. Fund quartiles are calculated by sorting data based on the IRRs of funds. The mean loss 
rate is high for the first quartile and slightly lower for the fourth quartile. The mean of intra-fund 
volatility for the first quartile is lower than the fourth quartile and consistent for the full sample, 
buyout and VC funds. We observe the same for the upside volatility, while for the downside 
volatility, the mean is high for the first quartile and low for the fourth quartile. In other words, 
funds with a low performance show, on average, a higher downside risk. In terms of skewness, 
the intra-funds IRR are highly positively skewed in the fourth quartile and less positively skewed 
in the first quartile. This is consistent for the full sample, buyout and VC funds. These statistics 
indicate that high fund performance is mainly driven by a few deals. The excessive skewness of 
the intra-fund IRRs justifies our choice of using robust regressions in our multivariate analysis. 
 
[Please insert Table 2 about here] 
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3. ANALYSIS 
 
3.1. Performance of VC and Buyout Investments 
We measure the performance of VC and buyout investments using IRR and investment multiple 
and Public Market Equivalent (PME). These measures of performance are widely used in the 
literature (see Harris, Jenkinson, Kaplan and Stucke, 2014; Harris, Jenkinson and Kaplan, 2014). 
Our measure of IRR is gross of fees, which include carried interest. We use all realized deals of a 
fund to estimate the IRR using cash flow from initial investments to the exit. The investment 
multiple compares the sum of all investments in portfolios companies with the sum of all cash 
outflows and the residual value of the investments. On the other hand, The PME can be viewed 
as a market-adjusted multiple of invested capital. Table 3 shows the mean and median IRR, 
multiple and PME in each investment year, based on deal-level data. The table further reports 
averages for the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. The results are reported separately for buyout and VC 
deals. The table shows significant variations in the IRR, multiple and PME for buyout deals 
across investment years. For all years, the average IRR is 19.8% and multiple and PME are 2.644 
and 1.842 respectively. Buyout deals before the financial crisis seem to have negative IRR, and 
low multiple and PME on average. The average IRR was low in the 1980s but significantly higher 
in the 1990s and 2000s. However, for the multiple the mean is quantitatively similar across all 
the investment years (mean multiple for 1980 W2008 is 2.644). The PME has been higher in the 
2000s as compared to the periods between 1980s and 1990s.  
 
[Please insert Table 3 about here] 
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For the VC investments, the performance patterns are different from the buyout 
segment. The average IRR across all investment years is 23.6%, multiple is 2.703 and PME is 
1.942. VC deals had exceptionally high IRRs of more than 70% on average during 1998 and 1999. 
This could be due to the dot.com bubble during that period. Over the same period, buyout 
funds generated an average IRR of 5.2% in 1998 and  W5.6% in 1999. The average IRR was low in 
the 1980s, rather high in the 1990s, and again negative in the 2000s. Furthermore, the average 
investment multiple and PME are lower in the 2000s than in the 1980s and 1990s. 
 Table 3 shows the IRRs and multiples for US and non-US funds, and Table 4 reports 
statistics of IRRs and investment multiples for deals carried out by US based funds only. We 
again separate the sample by fund type. For buyout deals, the average IRR in the 1980s was 
16.9% compared with 26.2% in the 1990s and 14.4% in the 2000s. The corresponding median 
IRR was 20.3%, 23.0% and 19.7%, respectively. The fact that the median IRRs are higher than the 
means suggests that the IRRs are skewed to the left. The returns during the Internet bubble are 
negative, but after the bubble, the returns are positive. In addition, the multiples were high in 
the 1980s and 1990s but low in the 2000s. For VC deals, the average IRR is 24.3%, while in the 
1990s, it was approximately 57.5% compared with  W23.6%. During the dot.com bubble in 1999, 
VC deals significantly outperformed the buyout deals in absolute terms. However, post-2000 the 
VC returns have been low and have persisted until the end of 2009. The fact that VC returns 
have been low on average is consistent with Harris, Jenkinson and Kaplan (2014) findings. Taken 
together, our results show that IRRs for the buyout segment are higher than those for VC after 
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2000, while in the 1990s, the IRRs of VC deals were higher than those of buyout deals. This 
evidence is consistent in the US and non-US subsamples.  
 
 [Please insert Table 4 about here] 
 
 Table 5 shows summary statistics in terms of fund sequence number included in our 
sample. Panel A shows statistics for the sample that also includes first funds. Panel B shows the 
same statistics but with follow-up funds only; i.e., only the sample of funds that are included in 
our analysis of performance and risk persistence. Measured by fund sequence number, the 
table indicates that our sample includes a large range of follow-up funds, some of which are 
managed by PE firms that have already raised a large number of other funds before. Comparing 
the sample size between the two panels (392 in Panel A versus 288 in Panel B), we can see that 
even in Panel A, the average PE firm is quite experienced, since we lose a rather limited number 
of observations when restricting the sample of follow-up funds. Panel B indicates that the 
average fund in our restricted sample is almost the 6th (exact mean is 5.85) fund of the PE firm 
(with median of 4th). Also, 59.19% of the funds in Panel B have a fund sequence number higher 
than three.  
 
 [Please insert Table 5 about here] 
 
3.2. Performance Persistence 
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In this section, we examine whether there is persistence in fund performance. The first step 
enables us to confirm existing findings. In the second step, we investigate whether fund risk 
explains the relationship between previous and current fund performance (i.e., performance 
persistence). 
 We examine the performance persistence using PME.
3
 We measure PME using the 
approach adopted by Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and Harris, Jenkinson, Kaplan and Stucke (2014), 
which compares an investment in a private equity fund with an equivalent investment in the 
relevant public stock market index. The PME can be viewed as a market-adjusted multiple of 
invested capital. For example, a PME of 1.5 indicates that at the end of the fund ?s life, investors 
ended up with 50% more than they would have obtained if they had invested in the public 
market. We use the S&P 500 Index to proxy for the public market for US funds and main 
national indices for all non-US funds. In accordance with the literature, we examine 
performance persistence for buyout and VC separately. 
 Table 6 shows our multivariate results for buyout funds, based on different subsamples: 
all buyout funds (Panel A), US buyout funds (Panel B) and non-US buyout funds (Panel C). Model 
1a (Panel A) shows persistence in PME over time, and it is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
When we control for fund size (Model 2a), persistence in PME remains significant, though at the 
10% level. Given that fund volatility may influence PME, in Models 3a and 4a we examine 
whether performance persistence remains significant after controlling for intra-fund volatility, 
our measure of risk. Thus, these two regressions directly test our prediction on performance 
persistence. As expected, persistence in PME is largely explained by fund volatility. In Model 4a, 
                                                          
3
 Using IRR yields similar results. Results are available on request. 
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we split the intra-fund volatility into upside and downside volatility. We find that performance 
persistence is explained away by both upside and downside volatilities. The PME is positively 
related to the upside volatility and negatively related to the downside volatility. The different 
sign of coefficients is consistent with the definition of upside and downside volatility used in our 
analysis. Performance persistence is therefore related to both fund upside and downside 
volatility.  
 
[Please insert Table 6 about here] 
 
To investigate whether PME persistence is specific to the US (and thus connects our 
analysis with existing studies that focus on the US), we examine performance persistence for US 
funds only (Table 6, Panel B). The results show that PME is persistent for US funds (Model 1b); 
this finding holds even when we control for fund size (Model 2b). Nonetheless, performance 
persistence is explained away by the intra-fund volatility, as shown in Models 3b. Model 4b 
shows that the persistence in PME is again explained away by both upside and downside 
volatility. Finally, Panel C shows the results for non-US funds. The results from Models 1c to 4c 
show no persistence in the PME in general, but the impact of volatility and the split between 
upside and down side volatilities are important determinants of the PME. The effects of upside 
and downside volatilities on PME are again statistically significant. 
 We next investigate performance persistence for VC funds. Typically, VC deals are 
smaller than buyout deals, and it is possible that the persistence in PME is restricted to buyout 
investments. In addition, VC investment opportunities are likely to be more time varying 
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because opportunities arise from technological changes. Thus, expertise may not be as long-
lived as for buyouts, making performance persistence less likely. Table 7 replicates Table 6 but 
for VC funds. Panel A shows results for all VC funds, Panel B for US VC funds and Panel C for 
non-US VC funds. Similar to buyout funds, the results show that PME is persistent among VC 
funds even after we control for fund size (Models 1a and 2a). Furthermore, intra-fund volatility 
(Model 3a) and upside or downside volatilities (Model 4a) are related to performance but do 
not explain away performance persistence. This finding contrasts with the case of buyout funds 
in Table 6. The results of Panel A show that performance is persistent among the VC funds. 
Panels B and C indicate that PME is persistent for US VC funds, but not for VC funds located 
elsewhere. A reason for this might be the lack of development of VC markets outside the US, so 
expertise, an important ingredient of performance persistence (Korteweg and Sorensen, 2014), 
is lower. Moreover, intra-fund volatility explains away only a small fraction of performance 
persistence. The results remain qualitatively the same when we separate the intra-fund 
volatility into upside and downside volatilities. Thus, PME performance is persistent for VC 
funds in the US. We find no evidence of PME performance persistence for non-US VC funds, 
though the PME is influenced positively by the upside volatility and negatively by the downside 
volatility in both subsamples. Overall, the results show that PME performance is persistent for 
the VC funds especially the US VC, in contrast with the buyout funds, for which the performance 
persistence is explained away by the upside and downside fund volatilities.  
 
[Please insert Table 7 about here] 
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3.3. Risk Persistence 
The findings in Section 3.2 raise follow-up questions about persistence in risk itself. In other 
words, if risk helps explain performance and affects the impact of performance persistence, it is 
likely that funds exhibit persistence in risk over time. We expect this to hold especially for US 
funds, for which performance persistence is strongest. To examine this prediction empirically, 
we estimate the same regressions as for performance persistence but now use our risk 
measure. Thus, we regress intra-fund volatility (standard deviation of IRRs) on the lag of intra-
fund volatility using the same set of control variables and fixed effects as for performance 
persistence.  
 Table 8 reports the results on risk persistence. Panel A shows the results for buyout 
funds, and Panel B shows the results for VC funds. For buyout funds (Panel A), we find that risk 
is persistent. This result is statistically significant at all conventional levels, even after we control 
for fund size (Model 2). In economic terms, we find that an increase of one standard deviation 
in intra-fund volatility of a VC fund increases volatility of the next VC fund by 34.2 percentage 
units; and 17.7 percentage units for buyout funds. When separating the sample by US and non-
US buyout funds, we find that the risk is persistent for US buyout funds (Models 3 and 4) but not 
for non-US funds. The lack of significant findings for non-US funds is consistent with the lack of 
findings of performance persistence for non-US funds. For VC funds (Panel B), we find similar 
results to buyout, as we observe risk persistence, but it is mostly driven by US funds. For non-US 
VC funds, we find no risk persistence after controlling for fund size (Model 6). Therefore, fund 
size captures the effect of the previous fund's risk. Larger funds also appear to have lower risk 
than smaller funds. 
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 Overall, our results show that risk is persistent in buyout and VC funds. Nonetheless, the 
persistence in risk is limited to US funds, while non-US funds show persistence only for the VC 
funds, which is explained away by fund size. These results suggest that performance persistence 
in VC or buyout funds, as documented in the literature, is due to risk persistence.  
 
[Please insert Table 8 about here] 
 
 As mentioned previously, risk persistence could be due to upside or downside volatility, 
or both. Thus, in Tables 9 and 10 we examine risk persistence in upside and downside intra-fund 
volatility separately. In both tables, Panel A shows the results for buyout funds and Panel B for 
VC funds. We further separate samples by US and non-US funds. Model 1 of Panel A shows that 
downside volatility is persistent for buyout funds after we control for fund size. However, for 
the US buyout funds, we do not find evidence of downside volatility, while for non-US funds, the 
downside volatility is persistent even after we control for fund size (Models 5 and 6). In Panel B, 
we investigate risk persistence for VC funds. Models 1 and 2 show risk persistence in VC funds 
for the full sample. In terms of economic significance, we find that an increase of one standard 
deviation in downside   volatility of a VC fund increases downside volatility of the next VC fund 
by 8.8 percentage units; and 6.4 percentage units for buyout funds. However, US funds exhibit 
higher persistence in the VC funds than non-US funds (Models 3 and 4 as compared with Models 
5 and 6). This difference is consistent with the view that the risk appetite for the US funds is 
different between VC and buyout. It is also true that VC funds take on more risk than buyout 
funds because of their deals, which are typically riskier than buyout investments. Moreover, the 
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difference between US and non-US buyout funds suggests that the US market is more 
competitive, which may explain the lack of persistence in the first place. Indeed, in a more 
competitive market, managers with loss-making funds may not be able to stay in the market in 
the first place, so persistence is not observed. 
 
[Please insert Table 9 about here] 
 
 We also examine whether the risk persistence is due to upside volatility. Table 10 reports 
the results. Panel A shows that upside volatility is not persistent in buyout investments. 
Separating the buyout funds into US and non-US samples, we find that only US funds show 
persistence in the upside volatility (Models 3 and 4 as compared with Models 5 and 6). For the 
VC funds (Panel B), we find no persistence in the upside volatility for VC funds in the full sample. 
However, non-US funds show persistence in the upside volatility (Model 5). In Model 6, we 
control for fund size, and the results show that risk persistence in the upside volatility is 
explained away by fund size. Thus, fund size drives persistence in the upside volatility for the 
non-US VC funds. Overall, these results suggest that there is no persistence in upside risk in any 
of the subsamples based on asset class (buyout or VC) or geography, with the sole exception of 
US VC funds. As previously, this result may be because the US VC market is more mature and 
thus populated by more experienced fund managers who have the skills to select top-
performing companies more often over time.  
 
[Please insert Table 10 about here] 
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 Finally, we use the Sharpe and Sortino ratios as measures of risk-adjusted performance 
to explore further performance persistence. The Sharpe ratio is generally defined as the return 
earned in excess of the risk-free rate per unit of total risk. In order to calculate the Sharpe ratio 
of the funds in our sample, we use the fund IRRs and proxy total risk by using the intra-fund 
volatility. The Sortino ratio differs from the Sharpe ratio in that it divides excess returns by the 
downside volatility. Hence, we calculate Sortino ratios using our measure of downside volatility. 
In general, the Sortino ratio is a more reasonable measure of risk-adjusted performance when 
analyzing assets that have highly skewed returns. In Table 11, we examine the persistence of 
these two measures for all buyout funds, US funds and non-US funds. Model 1a (Panel A) shows 
persistence in the Sharpe ratio for all funds even after we control for fund size (Model 2a). 
Models 3a and 3b in Panel A show no evidence of persistence in risk-adjusted performance 
using the Sortino ratio. For the US funds (Panel B), we find no evidence of persistence using the 
Sharpe ratio; however, we find weak evidence (significant at 10%) of persistence using the 
Sortino ratio. For the non-US funds, we find strong evidence of persistence using the Sharpe 
ratio but again no evidence using the Sortino ratio (Panel C). The Sharpe ratio exhibits 
persistence because of the non-US funds, while the US funds do not exhibit any persistence 
based on the Sharpe or Sortino ratio. 
 
[Please insert Table 11 about here] 
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 Table 12 reports persistence results for the VC funds again using the Sharpe and Sortino 
ratios. Panel A shows the results for all VC funds, Panel B shows the results for the US funds and 
Panel C shows the results for non-US funds. Models 1a and 2a in Panel A show the results of the 
Sharpe ratio, and Models 3a and 4a show the results of the Sortino ratio. For all funds, we find 
no evidence of persistence using either the Sharpe or Sortino ratio. Panel B shows the results for 
the US funds and clearly indicates that the Sortino ratio exhibits significant persistence, even 
after we control for fund size (Models 3b and 4b). Nonetheless, there is no evidence of 
persistence using the Sharpe ratio. For non-US VC funds, we find weak evidence of persistence 
using the Sortino ratio but not the Sharpe ratio.  
 
[Please insert Table 12 about here] 
 
3.4. Is Performance Driven by Outperformers or Cost Minimization? 
In this section, we investigate which type of risk helps explain outperformance, that is, whether 
performance is driven by picking outperformers (higher upside volatility) or minimizing losses 
(lower downside volatility). To do so, we focus on the IRR as a measure of performance. The IRR 
is the most appropriate measure here because we want to measure absolute returns, not risk-
adjusted returns as done with PME.  
 In Table 13, we first examine the relationship between IRR and risk as measured by intra-
fund volatility and then show the results for alternative measures of risk: skewness, downside 
volatility and upside volatility. These three measures help test for the direction of the 
distribution and, thus, the particular form of risk. The table presents results for all funds 
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(separately for buyout and VC), US funds and non-US funds. For the full sample, we find that the 
IRR is positively related to intra-fund volatility (Model 1 for buyout and Model 4 for VC). The 
coefficients are significant at the 1% level. In Models 2 and 5, we control for skewness and find 
that the results on volatility remain.  
 
[Please insert Table 13 about here] 
 
 However, these results reveal that intra-fund volatility is not always a good proxy for 
fund risk. For example, for the US buyout funds, the coefficient on intra-fund volatility turns out 
to be non-significant. This is most likely because private equity returns tend to deviate 
significantly from a normal distribution, in which case the volatility does not adequately 
represent risk. Therefore, we also split the intra-fund volatility into downside and upside 
volatility in the regressions (see Models 3 and 6). As expected, we find that the IRR is negatively 
related to downside and positively related to upside volatility. The regression coefficients are 
highly significant (mostly at the 1% level), regardless of the sample and asset class, with the 
exception of non-US VC funds. It is worthwhile here to compare the absolute values of the 
coefficients to separate the effect of out- and underperforming investments on the fund IRR. 
The results show that in absolute terms, the coefficients for the downside volatility are much 
larger than the coefficients for the upside volatility. The impact of downside volatility is 7.3 
times larger than upside volatility for buyout funds, and 1.5 times larger for VC funds. These 
differences in coefficients are highly significant, except for the non-US VC funds. That is, fund 
performance is driven more by fund managers being able to minimize losses than consistently 
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choosing outperforming investments. This finding holds for both the buyout and the VC funds. 
However, in line with expectations, selecting outperforming deals typically has a stronger effect 
on the performance of VC funds than for buyout funds, as indicated by the larger coefficients on 
the upside volatility for all funds and US VC funds only.  
 
3.5. Impact of Legal Factors and Fund Management Characteristics 
In this section, we consider alternative factors that might affect performance and risk 
persistence. First, we examine the impact of legal factors. Cumming, Dai, Hass, and Schweizer 
(2012) show that legal conditions affect performance persistence in the hedge fund industry. 
Similar effects may occur in private equity. Better investor and creditor protection may increase 
performance of investors and thereby also private equity funds. Further, Cumming and Knill 
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ƐŚŽǁ ƚŚĂƚ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ ĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞ ŝŶĚĞǆ ? ũƵĚŝĐŝĂů ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ĂŶĚ ĂŶƚŝ-director rights have 
positive impact on VC performance. A recent study by Cao, Cumming, Qian and Wang (2015) 
find that strong creditor rights influence LBO investments. Since legal conditions influence 
performance, they could also impact performance persistence. In order to examine the impact 
of legal conditions, we use a number of country characteristics similar to the previous studies 
and that we match with the country of the PE fund. First, we collect information of the legal 
origin of the fund's country. We construct a dummy variable to capture English legal origin. 
Second, we use more precise measures of investor and creditor rights commonly used in the 
"law and finance" literature (following La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998), 
including in the studies cited above. These are the Anti-director Rights, Creditor Rights, Public 
Enforcement Index, Efficiency of the Judiciary, Disclosure Requirements Index, and Burden of 
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Proof. All these variables are defined in Table 14 and taken from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1998) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2006).  
 
[Please insert Table 14 about here] 
 
 Our results show that country characteristics do not fully explain performance 
persistence in buyout investments as shown in Panel A of Table 14 (Models 1 to 4). None of the 
variables is statistically significant at the commonly used 5% level, while the result on 
performance persistence (the variable PMEt-1) still holds. In Models 5 to 8, we further include 
risk measures (upside and downside volatility) as additional control variables. The results 
indicate that risk continues to explain performance persistence in buyout funds and not legal 
conditions. Panel B shows results of the same specifications but for the subsample of VC funds. 
We conclude similarly. Therefore, our conclusions on the impact of risk on performance 
persistence are robust to the inclusion of controls for legal conditions in the country of the fund. 
 Second, we examine whether performance and risk persistence is driven by managerial 
style and other fund-specific characteristics (see Cumming, Siegel and Wright, 2007, for an 
overview of the literature on factors affecting the risk profile of funds). Cumming and Dai (2010) 
show that the propensity to syndicate, to stage, and to sit on boards, and the distance between 
investee and investor are critical factors to explain VC investments. Cumming and Dai (2011) 
further document that fund size affects performance and risk of private equity funds. Cao, 
Cumming, Qian and Wang (2015) find that whether investors are domestic or international 
further affects the risk profile of the buyout investments, since they may have different levels of 
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interest in taking risk. All these characteristics could influence the risk profile of VC or buyout 
funds and thereby performance and risk persistence. It may further control for changes in the 
composition of the managerial team over time, since such changes may also lead to changes in 
managerial styles. It is also documented in the literature that experienced PE firms tend to 
invest more in early stage rounds than less experienced ones. This investment behavior reflects 
their willingness to take more risk and hence might impact performance and risk persistence. To 
control for the impact of these different factors on persistence, we use different fund-level 
measures of PE firm experience, the propensity to do cross-border deals, to sit on boards, to 
syndicate and to stage investments. The results are provided in Table 15, where these additional 
variables are also defined.
4
  
 
[Please insert Table 15 about here] 
 
Models 1 to 3 of Table 15 show the results for the subsample of buyout funds, while Models 4 
to 6 for the subsample of VC funds. Again, we find that fund risk dominates in explaining 
performance persistence. In contrast, firm characteristics have no significant impact on risk 
persistence of buyout (Models 1 to 3 and VC (Models 4 to 6) funds. These results indicate 
robustness of our previous conclusions on the importance of fund risk in explaining persistence. 
 
                                                          
4
 In Table 14, we use the fund's sequence number (i.e., whether the considered fund is the first, second, ... fund 
managed by the PE firm) as proxy of PE firm experience. However, we obtain qualitatively similar results for two 
other measures of experience: the age of the PE firm (i.e., the vintage year of the last fund-raising minus the year in 
which the PE firm was founded), and the total number of portfolio companies of the PE firm (based on entire 
history in our sample).  
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3.6. Additional Tests 
We performed several robustness checks and additional tests that are not reported in any table. 
Our main finding on persistence in risk is also confirmed when treating Loss Rate (as defined in 
Section 2.3) as a measure of fund risk. Fund managers who have achieved a low loss rate in one 
fund will also largely have a lower loss rate in the next fund. 
 Other tests performed pertain to the question whether the relationship we find is due to 
other underlying relationships for which we did not control. For example, the relationship may 
be due to the strong specialization in private equity, especially in VC, in specific stages of 
development. That is, the consistently high loss rate across funds of a same manager could be 
due to this manager raising only early-stage funds, which tend to be riskier that other funds. 
However, adding dummies for stage focus of funds to the specification does not eliminate our 
result on risk persistence, nor does adding dummies for industry and regional focus of funds. 
These extra robustness checks confirm that risk persistence also holds within usual risk 
classifications (e.g., stage of development, geography, industry) of private equity funds. In this 
case, the underlying rationale for the persistence in risk could be due to the strong 
specialization need among fund managers.  
 Further, we examine the possible impact of differences in industries (such as high-tech 
versus non-high-tech), differences in vintage years and the effect of outliers. To examine the 
effect of industries on performance persistence, we include a dummy variable that equals one if 
the fund's industry focus is high-tech and 0 otherwise. Our definition of hi-tech industries is 
similar to Cumming and Dai (2010).
5
 Our results are robust to the inclusion of this additional 
                                                          
5
 These industries include health care, life science, high-tech and information technology sectors. 
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control variable and high-tech industries do not explain the performance persistence in PE. 
Next, we consider the effects of different vintage years by examining the post-1999 subsample 
only. Our choice of using the post-1999 period is motivated by study of Harris, Jenkinson, Kaplan 
and Stucke (2014), who takes a similar approach. They find only weak evidence of performance 
persistence post-2000 for buyout investments, while persistence for VC funds remain the same 
between pre- and post-2000. Our results for the VC funds are consistent with their findings. 
However, for the buyout investments, we find performance persistence also post-1999. Possibly 
this difference is because our sample includes both US and non-US funds, while their sample 
only considers US funds. Overall, our subsample analysis indicates our conclusions hold across a 
long time period for buyout and VC funds. Further, we winsorize the returns at the 1% and 5% 
levels to test the effect of outliers. We find that our results are robust controlling for the 
outliers.  
Finally, we examine the possible impact of survivorship bias. Indeed, our sample is restricted to 
PE firms that have raised multiple funds, since persistence can only be tested for subsequent 
funds. Other PE firms may have failed to do so (most likely due to poor performance) and hence 
our results might be subject to survivorship bias. To address this concern, we use a two-stage 
Heckman estimation model for buyout and VC funds separately. In the first stage, we estimate 
the probability of raising a subsequent fund. In the second stage, we then estimate the 
performance persistence based on our restricted sample as done so far but include the Inverse 
Mills' Ratio as additional control variable.  We find no evidence that survivorship bias impacts 
our analysis of risk and performance persistence.  
 
31 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
This study examines the impact of fund-level risk on performance persistence as well as risk 
persistence in private equity. Consistent with Kaplan and Schoar (2005), we find that returns are 
persistent for VC and buyout funds for US funds. We further extend the analysis by providing 
evidence for non-US funds, for which persistence tends to be weaker. Our study extends the 
results of Kaplan and Schoar and related studies, by showing that risk as measured by the 
standard deviation of IRR is persistent for VC and buyout funds regardless of whether these 
funds are based in the US or outside the US. We interpret these results of performance 
persistence in private equity to be due largely to persistence in risk. In other words, private 
equity funds tend to invest persistently in deals with similar risk-return levels, which in turn 
leads to persistence in both risk and return.  
 We believe our conclusions can be extended to other types of financial intermediaries, in 
particular to hedge funds for which Cumming, Dai, Hass, and Schweizer (2012) has also 
documented performance persistence. These authors have shown that regulation may affect 
the extent of performance persistence, while our study indicates that such persistence may also 
be related to persistence in risk. Unlike other studies, our data allow us to directly control for 
fund risk. Since the economic arguments proposed in our study are not specific to private 
equity, fund risk is likely to be a driver of persistence also in other fund industries where 
performance persistence can be observed. 
 Our analysis has some limitations, which also offer opportunities for future research if 
additional information becomes available. For instance, the managerial team of a PE 
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management firm may change over time. Such changes in the composition of the managerial 
team may affect performance persistence if the latter is attributed to specific, non-transferable 
expertise of managers. Tracking changes in the composition of managerial teams may offer 
further insights into what drives performance and risk persistence. Similarly, persistence may be 
stronger in certain industries for which specific expertise may be more important than in other 
industries. Along similar vein, persistence may be lost if investments are made in other 
industries, which may happen when investment opportunities shift to new industries over time. 
Finally, performance and risk persistence may evolve over time, notably during bubble years in 
which risks and returns may be distorted. We leave these insights for future research.  
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Figure 1: VC and buyout funds by vintage year 
This figure shows the number of buyout and VC funds in our sample by vintage year from 1980 to 2008. 
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Table 1: Sample distribution of VC and buyout investments 
This table shows the distribution of VC and buyout investments by investment year. The buyout and VC 
deals are divided into deals made by US and non-US funds. The table also indicates the number of these 
deals that are realized (i.e., exited). At the end, the table shows the total number of deals as well as the 
subsample of deals in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, respectively.  
  Buyout investments 
 
VC investments 
 
Full sample US 
 
Non-US 
 
Full sample US 
 
Non-US 
Investment 
year 
 
All 
deals 
Realized 
Deals 
All 
deals 
Realized 
deals 
  
All 
deals 
Realized 
deals 
 
All 
Deals 
Realized 
deals 
1980 1 0 0 
 
1 1 
 
0 0 0 
 
0 0 
1981 5 0 0 
 
5 5 
 
8 8 7 
 
0 0 
1982 2 0 0 
 
2 1 
 
18 18 14 
 
0 0 
1983 5 1 1 
 
4 4 
 
19 19 16 
 
0 0 
1984 10 8 6 
 
2 1 
 
32 32 27 
 
0 0 
1985 17 12 9 
 
5 5 
 
48 48 47 
 
0 0 
1986 25 22 16 
 
3 3 
 
70 64 59 
 
6 5 
1987 56 28 23 
 
28 24 
 
73 51 44 
 
22 19 
1988 72 48 44 
 
24 24 
 
97 83 76 
 
14 14 
1989 97 73 72 
 
24 24 
 
130 122 118 
 
8 7 
1990 173 94 90 
 
79 73 
 
125 97 94 
 
28 25 
1991 178 85 83 
 
93 89 
 
143 95 79 
 
48 43 
1992 177 91 86 
 
86 82 
 
153 126 123 
 
27 24 
1993 182 106 101 
 
76 70 
 
219 154 142 
 
65 60 
1994 294 141 131 
 
153 135 
 
256 187 168 
 
69 56 
1995 271 113 97 
 
158 141 
 
314 236 212 
 
78 64 
1996 326 136 117 
 
190 161 
 
475 332 289 
 
143 95 
1997 400 144 111 
 
256 208 
 
584 440 354 
 
144 92 
1998 447 172 112 
 
275 169 
 
804 616 471 
 
188 128 
1999 539 192 117 
 
347 218 
 
1241 951 648 
 
290 192 
2000 702 249 132 
 
453 244 
 
1817 1253 715 
 
564 292 
2001 344 97 55 
 
247 126 
 
925 652 288 
 
273 119 
2002 366 113 46 
 
253 132 
 
680 514 177 
 
166 46 
2003 341 132 45 
 
209 87 
 
693 548 176 
 
145 40 
2004 385 155 36 
 
230 53 
 
773 603 138 
 
170 41 
2005 432 166 38 
 
266 44 
 
640 455 63 
 
185 38 
2006 438 156 7 
 
282 25 
 
614 467 35 
 
147 6 
2007 320 119 1 
 
201 3 
 
399 310 12 
 
89 3 
2008 91 38 1 
 
53 0 
 
178 152 2 
 
26 1 
2009 6 0 0 
 
6 0 
 
26 3 0 
 
23 1 
Total 6702 2691 1577 
 
4011 2152 
 
11554 8636 4594 
 
2918 1411 
1980s 290 192 171 
 
98 92 
 
495 445 408 
 
50 45 
1990s 2987 1274 1045 
 
1713 1346 
 
4314 3234 2580 
 
1080 779 
2000s 3425 1225 361 
 
2200 714 
 
6745 4957 1606 
 
1788 587 
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Table 2: Summary statistics of different risk measures of funds 
This table shows the mean and median values for Loss Rate, Intra-Fund Volatility of IRRs, Intra-Fund Downside and Upside Volatility of IRRs and Intra-Fund 
Skewness of IRRs, based on deal-level cash flow data. The table shows the statistics for the full sample, buyout and VC deals and for all quartiles, first 
quartile and fourth quartile, respectively. 
  
 
All quartiles 
 
First quartiles 
 
Fourth quartiles 
 
Full 
sample Buyout VC 
 
Full 
sample Buyout VC 
 
Full 
sample Buyout VC 
Loss Rate 
            
 
Mean 8.46% 6.06% 14.82% 
 
11.97% 8.57% 16.61% 
 
9.04% 4.59% 16.33% 
 
Median 3.85% 0.00% 13.04% 
 
7.02% 0.00% 14.73% 
 
4.55% 0.00% 15.00% 
             Intra-Fund Volatility of IRRs 
            
 
Mean 101.22% 92.20% 123.10% 
 
60.94% 46.32% 78.46% 
 
174.62% 144.47% 214.23% 
 
Median 58.18% 57.99% 69.76% 
 
44.82% 42.29% 50.42% 
 
107.81% 82.13% 150.58% 
             Intra-Fund Downside Volatility of IRRs 
           
 
Mean 27.50% 22.38% 40.21% 
 
35.72% 29.17% 44.01% 
 
25.66% 14.79% 41.04% 
 
Median 27.96% 23.21% 43.25% 
 
39.12% 31.99% 47.66% 
 
25.87% 3.39% 44.95% 
             Intra-Fund Upside Volatility of IRRs 
            
 
Mean 97.21% 94.00% 111.15% 
 
43.59% 30.33% 57.58% 
 
186.69% 167.17% 213.48% 
 
Median 50.18% 56.10% 55.49% 
 
19.22% 17.38% 21.47% 
 
114.28% 96.67% 145.98% 
             Intra-Fund Skewness of IRRs 
            
 
Mean 1.12 0.89 1.62 
 
0.59 0.48 1.07 
 
1.75 0.96 1.95 
  Median 0.94 0.82 1.49 
 
0.13 0.08 0.39 
 
1.71 1.20 2.44 
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Table 3: Summary statistics on deal-level performance 
This table shows the mean and median IRR, investment multiple and PME based on the full sample of fully 
realized deals. The table shows IRR investment multiple and PME statistics by investment year and by buyout 
and VC subsamples. IRR, multiples and PME are gross of fees and carried interest payments. 
 
 
Buyout 
 
VC 
Investment 
year  
IRR Multiple PME 
 
IRR Multiple PME 
No. 
deals Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
No. 
Deals Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
1980 1 0.044 0.044 1.384 1.384 0.380 0.380 ² ² ² ² ² ² ² 
1981 5 0.194 0.092 7.474 1.958 2.422 0.670 7 -0.167 -0.545 1.510 0.135 0.933 0.070 
1982 1 -0.212 -0.212 0.171 0.171 0.040 0.040 14 0.262 0.256 8.497 3.414 3.284 1.320 
1983 5 0.152 0.056 2.358 1.558 1.132 0.490 16 -0.346 -0.640 3.365 0.049 1.479 0.025 
1984 7 0.794 0.471 9.303 9.506 4.359 3.330 27 0.042 -0.030 3.334 0.782 1.545 0.180 
1985 14 0.248 0.304 4.487 2.797 2.181 1.400 47 -0.161 0.016 2.402 1.166 0.990 0.580 
1986 19 0.303 0.250 3.142 2.839 1.953 1.820 64 0.061 0.091 3.332 1.700 1.762 0.795 
1987 47 0.029 0.066 2.741 1.413 1.711 0.660 63 0.003 0.073 2.465 1.272 1.487 0.800 
1988 68 0.045 0.104 2.169 1.723 1.178 0.800 90 -0.067 0.004 3.279 1.022 1.659 0.570 
1989 96 0.001 0.144 2.410 1.620 1.442 1.070 125 0.130 0.099 3.016 1.682 1.767 0.790 
1990 163 0.197 0.171 2.946 2.000 1.727 1.060 119 0.093 0.101 2.609 1.655 1.552 0.930 
1991 172 0.349 0.343 3.313 2.551 1.993 1.515 122 0.055 0.124 2.631 1.432 1.505 0.855 
1992 168 0.369 0.268 3.138 2.133 1.867 1.445 147 0.273 0.130 4.174 1.652 2.489 0.920 
1993 171 0.563 0.424 5.048 3.025 2.716 1.780 202 0.209 0.108 3.542 1.597 1.876 0.770 
1994 266 0.320 0.300 3.128 2.338 1.474 1.130 224 0.225 0.101 4.122 1.404 2.094 0.680 
1995 238 0.300 0.237 2.741 1.866 1.467 0.980 276 0.385 0.214 3.922 1.650 2.068 0.880 
1996 278 0.208 0.163 2.825 1.694 1.540 1.020 384 0.387 0.108 4.436 1.391 2.527 0.845 
1997 319 0.159 0.185 2.577 1.785 1.815 1.260 446 0.359 0.040 4.122 1.128 2.901 0.820 
1998 281 0.052 0.123 2.128 1.608 1.857 1.330 599 1.166 -0.026 5.115 0.946 4.217 0.750 
1999 335 -0.056 0.056 1.624 1.252 1.783 1.230 840 0.714 -0.451 2.092 0.205 2.117 0.225 
2000 376 -0.138 -0.005 1.549 0.990 1.818 1.075 1007 -0.384 -0.611 0.646 0.067 0.688 0.080 
2001 181 0.123 0.223 2.265 1.907 2.121 1.770 407 -0.368 -0.448 1.043 0.170 0.923 0.130 
2002 178 0.358 0.393 3.189 2.390 2.317 1.795 223 0.105 -0.299 1.627 0.440 1.301 0.340 
2003 132 0.565 0.569 3.020 2.731 2.241 2.005 216 0.015 -0.122 2.018 0.759 1.501 0.570 
2004 89 0.512 0.590 2.680 2.633 2.174 2.110 179 0.202 -0.045 2.220 0.927 1.864 0.730 
2005 82 0.447 0.551 2.141 1.808 1.879 1.475 101 0.010 -0.131 1.283 0.762 1.127 0.660 
2006 32 0.564 0.677 2.032 2.025 1.803 1.835 41 0.263 -0.941 1.387 0.004 1.268 0.000 
2007 4 -0.714 -0.999 0.310 0.023 0.535 0.025 15 0.929 -0.962 1.213 0.059 1.220 0.060 
2008 1 -1.000 -1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 3 -0.639 -1.000 0.347 0.000 0.377 0.000 
Total 3729 0.198 0.205 2.644 1.874 1.842 1.310 6004 0.236 -0.137 2.703 0.574 1.942 0.440 
1980s 263 0.079 0.135 2.836 1.732 1.579 0.930 453 0.011 0.063 3.150 1.284 1.636 0.660 
1990s 2391 0.214 0.199 2.791 1.892 1.786 1.210 3359 0.555 0.003 3.671 1.015 2.597 0.690 
2000s 1075 0.191 0.246 2.269 1.867 2.031 1.660 2193 -0.206 -0.518 1.129 0.144 1.004 0.150 
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Table 4: Summary statistics on deal-level performance for the US subsample 
This table shows the mean and median IRR, investment multiple and PME based on the US sample of fully realized 
deals. The table shows IRR, investment multiple and PME statistics by investment year and by buyout and VC 
subsamples. IRR, multiples and PME are gross of fees and carried interest payments. 
 
 
US buyout 
  
US VC 
Investment  
year  
IRR Multiple PME 
  
IRR Multiple PME 
No.  
deals Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
 
No. 
 Deals Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
1981        
 
7 -0.167 -0.545 1.510 0.135 0.933 0.070 
1982        
 
14 0.262 0.256 8.497 3.414 3.284 1.320 
1983 1 0.381 0.381 3.635 3.635 1.680 1.680 
 
16 -0.346 -0.640 3.365 0.049 1.479 0.025 
1984 6 0.922 0.660 10.654 12.275 5.013 3.740 
 
27 0.042 -0.030 3.334 0.782 1.545 0.180 
1985 9 0.648 0.536 6.386 2.976 3.131 2.070 
 
47 -0.161 0.016 2.402 1.166 0.990 0.580 
1986 16 0.323 0.354 3.449 2.994 2.112 1.920 
 
59 0.067 0.092 3.469 1.710 1.829 0.860 
1987 23 0.213 0.110 3.572 1.530 2.164 0.790 
 
44 -0.031 0.049 2.576 1.242 1.586 0.625 
1988 44 0.087 0.150 2.336 2.011 1.232 0.900 
 
76 -0.072 0.004 3.550 1.019 1.817 0.620 
1989 72 0.046 0.161 2.702 2.102 1.616 1.135 
 
118 0.131 0.098 3.073 1.679 1.793 0.805 
1990 90 0.385 0.309 3.610 2.095 2.147 1.290 
 
94 0.140 0.175 2.777 1.820 1.650 1.090 
1991 83 0.501 0.483 3.931 2.899 2.475 2.110 
 
79 0.042 0.124 2.793 1.432 1.606 0.840 
1992 86 0.378 0.286 2.820 2.133 1.759 1.505 
 
123 0.154 0.109 4.014 1.651 2.263 0.850 
1993 101 0.669 0.439 6.199 3.917 3.300 1.990 
 
142 0.221 0.136 3.552 1.613 1.939 0.775 
1994 131 0.318 0.326 3.411 2.569 1.612 1.160 
 
168 0.223 0.102 3.613 1.463 1.828 0.650 
1995 97 0.341 0.211 2.854 1.701 1.444 0.930 
 
212 0.437 0.217 4.224 1.650 2.241 0.880 
1996 117 0.194 0.117 2.689 1.639 1.447 0.980 
 
289 0.486 0.120 4.928 1.725 2.829 0.980 
1997 111 0.117 0.188 2.890 1.865 2.044 1.340 
 
354 0.308 0.000 4.302 1.000 3.041 0.770 
1998 112 0.037 0.124 1.941 1.715 1.688 1.495 
 
471 1.234 -0.063 5.525 0.776 4.562 0.720 
1999 117 -0.141 0.004 1.355 1.027 1.415 0.980 
 
648 0.703 -0.501 1.950 0.164 1.961 0.185 
2000 132 -0.221 -0.124 1.118 0.586 1.336 0.530 
 
715 -0.425 -0.616 0.648 0.067 0.701 0.080 
2001 55 0.056 0.216 1.984 1.753 1.814 1.610 
 
288 -0.381 -0.513 1.070 0.108 0.946 0.115 
2002 46 0.488 0.498 4.182 2.826 2.920 1.920 
 
177 0.077 -0.274 1.785 0.540 1.413 0.470 
2003 45 0.536 0.547 2.599 2.438 1.986 1.840 
 
176 -0.037 -0.255 1.574 0.621 1.195 0.485 
2004 36 0.556 0.590 2.700 2.382 2.238 1.945 
 
138 0.206 -0.023 2.167 0.947 1.803 0.740 
2005 38 0.277 0.386 1.827 1.273 1.546 1.155 
 
63 0.006 -0.540 1.309 0.200 1.153 0.180 
2006 7 0.396 0.311 1.724 1.552 1.509 1.420 
 
35 0.231 -1.000 1.207 0.000 1.113 0.000 
2007 1 -1.000 -1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
12 0.042 -0.976 0.885 0.045 0.885 0.045 
2008 1 -1.000 -1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
2 -0.458 -0.458 0.521 0.521 0.565 0.565 
Total 1577 0.225 0.224 2.891 1.932 1.870 1.310 
 
4594 0.243 -0.159 2.815 0.523 2.009 0.410 
1980s 171 0.169 0.203 3.273 2.193 1.837 1.210 
 
408 0.008 0.060 3.276 1.266 1.695 0.630 
1990s 1045 0.262 0.230 3.115 2.067 1.900 1.300 2580 0.575 0.000 3.797 1.000 2.687 0.630 
2000s 361 0.144 0.197 2.063 1.492 1.800 1.350 
 
1606 -0.231 -0.540 1.121 0.132 1.000 0.130 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics for funds 
This table shows descriptive statistics for the sample of VC and buyout funds based on fund sequence 
number. Panel A reports statistics for the full sample of funds and Panel B reports statistics for the sub-
sample of funds with a predecessor fund (i.e., those included in our analysis of performance and risk 
persistence). Fund Sequence Number indicates whether the fund is the  first, second, third, and larger 
than third fund of the PE management firm.  Statistics provided are mean, median, standard deviation 
(Std), minimum (Min) and maximum (Max) of the sequence numbers of the sample funds.  
    Buyout       Venture Capital 
  All funds US funds Non-US funds 
 
All funds US funds Non-US funds 
Panel A: Full Sample of Funds 
Percentage of Funds by Fund Sequence 
     First Funds 23.47% 22.00% 24.38% 
 
21.49% 20.51% 24.04% 
Second Funds 17.86% 15.33% 19.42% 
 
21.22% 19.05% 26.92% 
Third Funds 14.29% 14.00% 14.46% 
 
17.24% 15.38% 22.12% 
Later (> Third) Funds 44.39% 48.67% 41.74% 
 
40.05% 45.05% 26.92% 
        Statistics on Fund Sequence Numbers 
     Mean 4.71 5.79 4.05 
 
4.06 4.34 3.33 
Median 3 3 3 
 
3 3 2 
Std 5.46 7.01 4.10 
 
4.41 4.73 3.36 
Min 1 1 1 
 
1 1 1 
Max 40 40 32 
 
45 45 27 
No. Obs. 392 150 242  377 273 104 
        
Panel B: Sub-Sample of Funds with a Predecessor Fund 
Percentage of Funds by Fund Sequence 
Second Funds 23.53% 20.95% 25.15% 
 
24.69% 23.28% 29.63% 
Third Funds 17.28% 17.15% 17.36% 
 
20.16% 19.05% 24.07% 
Later (> Third) Funds 59.19% 61.90% 57.49% 
 
55.15% 57.67% 46.30% 
        Statistics on Fund Sequence Numbers 
     Mean 5.85 6.97 5.16 
 
5.07 5.21 4.59 
Median 4 4 4 
 
4 4 3 
Std 5.60 7.00 4.38 
 
4.78 4.97 4.05 
Min 2 2 2 
 
2 2 2 
Max 33 33 32 
 
45 45 27 
No. Obs. 288 110 178  248 192 56 
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Table 6: Performance persistence in buyout funds 
This table shows performance persistence for buyout funds based on the sample of all funds, US funds and non-US funds. The dependent variable 
is the logarithm of PME of the current fund (at time t). All the variables are defined in Appendix Table 1. Diff. Coeff. gives the difference (in 
absolute terms) of the coefficients for Upside Vol and Downside Vol., while t-Value Diff. reports the value of the corresponding t-test. We include 
dummies for vintage year of current fund and previous fund in all our regressions. ***,**,* are significant level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
  Panel A: All buyout funds 
 
Panel B: US buyout funds 
 
Panel C: Non-US buyout funds 
                     
  Models 
 
Models 
 
Models 
  1a 2a 3a 4a 
 
1b 2b 3b 4b 
 
1c 2c 3c 4c 
PME t-1 0.113** 0.101* 0.095* 0.074 
 
0.171** 0.181** 0.105 0.109 
 
0.087 0.085 0.098 0.004 
 
(2.08) (1.85) (1.77) (1.47) 
 
(2.18) (2.27) (1.43) (1.59) 
 
(1.15) (1.11) (1.40) (0.06) 
Fund Size 
 
-0.031 
    
0.009 
    
-0.008 
  
  
(-1.58) 
    
(0.27) 
    
(-0.29) 
  Intra-F Vol 
  
0.054*** 
    
0.073** 
    
0.070*** 
 
   
(2.76) 
    
(2.11) 
    
(3.03) 
 Upside Vol 
   
0.085*** 
    
0.116*** 
    
0.071*** 
    
(4.81) 
    
(3.78) 
    
(3.28) 
Downside Vol 
   
-0.649*** 
    
-0.586*** 
    
-0.744*** 
    
(-4.59) 
    
(-3.45) 
    
(-3.79) 
               No. Obs. 287 286 285 287 
 
110 109 109 110 
 
178 178 176 176 
Adj. R-sq 0.038 0.049 0.092 0.199 
 
0.487 0.458 0.593 0.677 
 
0.260 0.230 0.215 0.177 
Diff. Coeff.    0.564***     0.470***     0.673*** 
t-Value Diff.    (3.95)     (2.72)     (3.41) 
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Table 7: Performance persistence in VC funds 
This table shows performance persistence for VC funds based on the sample of all funds, US funds and non-US funds. The dependent variable is 
the logarithm of PME of the current fund (at time t). All the variables are defined in Appendix Table 1. Diff. Coeff. gives the difference (in absolute 
terms) of the coefficients for Upside Vol and Downside Vol., while t-Value Diff. reports the value of the corresponding t-test. We include dummies 
for vintage year of current fund and previous fund in all our regressions. ***,**,* are significant level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
  Panel A: All VC funds   Panel B: US VC funds   Panel C: Non-US VC funds 
 
  
             
  
Models 
 
Models 
 
Models 
  
1a 2a 3a 4a 
 
1b 2b 3b 4b 
 
1c 2c 3c 4c 
PME t-1 0.205*** 0.214*** 0.134** 0.124**  
 
0.183*** 0.189*** 0.147** 0.137**  
 
0.131 0.143 0.081 0.095 
 
 (3.79) (3.96) (2.50) (2.51) 
 
(2.81) (2.87) (2.33) (2.19) 
 
(1.47) (1.55) (0.88) (1.09) 
Fund Size 
 
0.031 
 
         
  
0.022 
 
         
  
-0.029 
 
         
  
(0.96) 
 
         
  
(0.52) 
 
         
  
(-0.53) 
 
         
Intra-F Vol 
  
0.088***          
   
0.071***          
   
0.273***          
   
(3.76)          
   
(2.78)          
   
(3.56)          
Upside Vol 
   
0.178*** 
    
0.082*** 
    
0.264*** 
    
(8.61) 
    
(3.43) 
    
(3.93) 
Downside Vol 
   
-0.682*** 
    
-0.635*** 
    
-0.722* 
    
(-3.78)   
    
(-2.88)   
    
(-1.84)   
               No. Obs. 246 248 247 247 
 
191 191 190 191 
 
55 54 56 54 
Adj. R-sq 0.389 0.388 0.417 0.553   0.426 0.416 0.460 0.486   0.430 0.420 0.460 0.480 
Diff. Coeff.        0.504***     0.553**     0.458 
t-Value Diff.    (2.77)     (2.49)     (1.15) 
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Table 8: Persistence in risk 
This table shows risk persistence using intra-fund volatility estimated by deal-level data. Panel A shows the volatility persistence using buyout funds, 
and Panel B shows the persistence using VC funds. The dependent variable Intra-F Vol is the standard deviation of deal-level IRRs of the current 
fund (at time t), as defined in Section 2.2. All the variables are defined in Appendix Table 1. We include dummies for vintage year of current fund 
and previous fund in our regressions. ***,**,* are significant level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
Panel A: Buyout funds 
All funds US funds Non-US funds 
Models 
  
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
Intra-F Vol
 t-1 0.157*** 
 
0.155*** 
 
0.249*** 
 
0.244*** 
 
0.079 
 
0.078 
 
(3.43) 
 
(3.36) 
 
(5.07) 
 
(4.58) 
 
(1.12) 
 
(1.08) 
            Fund Size 
  
0.012 
   
0.058* 
   
0.012 
   
(0.48) 
   
(1.67) 
   
(0.28) 
            No. Obs. 279 
 
279 
 
106 
 
107 
 
173 
 
171 
Adj. R-sq 0.280 
 
0.269 
 
0.785 
 
0.754 
 
0.209 
 
0.205 
Panel B: VC funds 
           
           
 Intra-F Vol
 t-1 0.214*** 
 
0.218*** 
 
0.202*** 
 
0.160** 
 
0.209*** 
 
0.005 
 
(3.40) 
 
(3.45) 
 
(2.76) 
 
(2.24) 
 
(3.3) 
 
(0.01) 
            Fund Size 
  
0.075 
   
0.102* 
   
-0.309*** 
   
(1.64) 
   
(1.76) 
   
(-3.70) 
            No. Obs. 241 
 
241 
 
186 
 
184 
 
54 
 
51 
Adj. R-sq 0.434 
 
0.441 
 
0.668 
 
0.500 
 
0.827 
 
0.810 
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Table 9: Persistence in downside risk 
This table shows downside risk persistence using downside fund volatility estimated using deal data. Panel A shows the persistence using buyout 
funds, and Panel B shows the persistence using VC funds. The dependent variable Downside Vol is the downside volatility based on deal-level IRRs 
of the current fund (at time t), as defined in Section 2.2. All the variables are defined in Appendix Table 1. We include dummies for vintage year of 
current fund and previous fund in our regressions. ***,**,* are significant level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Buyout funds 
All funds US funds Non-US funds 
Models 
  
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 Downside Vol
 t-1 0.367*** 
 
0.372*** 
 
0.077 
 
0.101 
 
0.433*** 
 
0.442*** 
 
(5.95) 
 
(5.99) 
 
(0.67) 
 
(0.89) 
 
(5.76) 
 
(5.89) 
            Fund Size 
  
-0.003 
   
-0.012 
   
-0.017 
   
(-0.30) 
   
(-0.61) 
   
(-1.61) 
            No. Obs. 288 
 
288 
 
110 
 
110 
 
178 
 
178 
Adj. R-sq 0.330 
 
0.328 
 
0.391 
 
0.400 
 
0.322 
 
0.337 
Panel B: VC funds 
           
           
 Downside Vol
 t-1 0.596*** 
 
0.592*** 
 
0.607*** 
 
0.603*** 
 
0.145 
 
0.878*** 
 
(8.03) 
 
(7.99) 
 
(7.97) 
 
(7.78) 
 
(0.48) 
 
(13.09) 
            Fund Size 
  
0.012 
   
0.002 
   
0.002 
   
(1.12) 
   
(0.18) 
   
(0.30) 
            No. Obs. 247 
 
248 
 
192 
 
192 
 
55 
 
54 
Adj. R-sq 0.518 
 
0.532 
 
0.656 
 
0.649 
 
0.445 
 
0.974 
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Table 10: Persistence in upside risk 
This table shows upside risk persistence using upside fund volatility estimated using deal data. Panel A shows the persistence using buyout funds, 
and Panel B shows the persistence using VC funds. The dependent variable Upside Vol is the upside volatility based on deal-level IRRs of the current 
fund (at time t), as defined in Section 2.2. All the variables are defined in Appendix Table 1. We include dummies for vintage year of current fund 
and previous fund in our regressions. ***,**,* are significant level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
Panel A: Buyout funds 
All funds US funds Non-US funds 
Models 
  
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
Upside Vol
 t-1 -0.006 
 
-0.006 
 
0.053 
 
0.066** 
 
-0.020 
 
-0.019 
 
(-0.38) 
 
(-0.38) 
 
(1.57) 
 
(2.14) 
 
(-1.00) 
 
(-0.96) 
            Fund Size 
  
0.003 
   
-0.069** 
   
0.015 
   
(0.21) 
   
(-2.35) 
   
(0.69) 
            No. Obs. 286 
 
288 
 
109 
 
109 
 
178 
 
176 
Adj. R-sq 0.161 
 
0.166 
 
0.452 
 
0.566 
 
0.233 
 
0.225 
Panel B: VC funds 
                      
                      
 Upside Vol
 t-1 0.020 
 
0.021 
 
0.013 
 
0.010 
 
0.067*** 
 
-0.014 
 
(1.10) 
 
(1.18) 
 
(0.64) 
 
(0.53) 
 
(9.11) 
 
(-0.55) 
            Fund Size 
  
0.074* 
   
0.090** 
   
-0.211*** 
   
(2.47) 
   
(2.25) 
   
(-5.56) 
            No. Obs. 247 
 
248 
 
189 
 
192 
 
54 
 
50 
Adj. R-sq 0.625 
 
0.635 
 
0.678 
 
0.714 
 
0.951 
 
0.961 
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Table 11: Persistence in buyout funds using Sharpe and Sortino ratios 
This table shows persistence in buyout funds using Sharpe and Sortino ratios. The table shows the results for all buyout funds, US funds and non-US funds. 
The dependent variable is the Sharpe ratio in Models 1 and 2 and the Sortino ratio in Models 3 and 4. All the variables are defined in Appendix Table 1. We 
include dummies for vintage year of current fund and previous fund in our regressions. ***,**,* are significant level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
  Panel A: All buyout funds 
 
Panel B: US buyout funds 
 
Panel C: Non-US buyout funds 
                        
  
Models 
 
Models 
 
Models 
  
1a 
 
2a 
 
3a 
 
4a 
 
1b 
 
2b 
 
3b 
 
4b 
 
1c 
 
2c 
 
3c 
 
4c 
Sharpe Ratio t-1 0.127** 
 
0.139** 
     
0.055 
 
0.055 
     
0.216** 
 
0.226*** 
    
 
(2.21) 
 
(2.44) 
     
(1.08) 
 
(1.06) 
     
(2.60) 
 
(2.70) 
    Fund Size 
  
-0.029 
   
0.049 
   
0.001 
   
0.067 
   
-0.021 
   
-0.007 
 
  
(-1.44) 
   
(1.19) 
   
(0.04) 
   
(1.06) 
   
(-0.77) 
   
(-0.07) 
Sortino Ratio t-1 
    
0.002 
 
0.002 
     
0.021 
 
0.025* 
     
-0.009 
 
-0.008 
 
    
(1.52) 
 
(1.63) 
     
(1.53) 
 
(1.85) 
     
(-0.02) 
 
(-0.02) 
 
                       No. Obs. 279 
 
280 
 
201 
 
202 
 
107 
 
107 
 
82 
 
83 
 
172 
 
171 
 
116 
 
117 
Adj. R-sq 0.103 
 
0.119 
 
0.851 
 
0.853 
 
0.714 
 
0.708 
 
0.926 
 
0.929 
 
0.174 
 
0.148 
 
0.807 
 
0.835 
 
48 
 
Table 12: Persistence in VC funds using Sharpe and Sortino ratios 
This table shows persistence in VC funds using Sharpe and Sortino ratios. The table shows the results for all VC funds, US funds and non-US funds. The 
dependent variable is the Sharpe ratio in Models 1 and 2 and the Sortino ratio in Models 3 and 4. All the variables are defined in Appendix Table 1. We 
include dummies for vintage year of current fund and previous fund in our regressions. ***,**,* are significant level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 
  Panel A: All VC funds 
 
Panel B: US VC funds 
 
Panel C: Non-US VC funds 
                        
  
Models 
 
Models 
 
Models 
  
1a 
 
2a 
 
3a 
 
4a 
 
1b 
 
2b 
 
3b 
 
4b 
 
1c 
 
2c 
 
3c 
 
4c 
Sharpe Ratio t-1 0.076 
 
0.078 
     
0.024 
 
0.014 
     
0.206 
 
0.218 
    
 
(1.19) 
 
(1.22) 
     
(0.47) 
 
(0.27) 
     
(1.44) 
 
(1.53) 
    Fund Size 
  
0.007 
   
0.003 
   
0.003 
   
0.019 
   
0.037 
   
-0.015 
   
(0.34) 
   
(0.06) 
   
(0.14) 
   
(0.35) 
   
(0.72) 
   
(-0.16) 
Sortino Ratio t-1 
    
0.007 
 
0.007 
     
-0.058*** 
 
-0.058*** 
     
0.118* 
 
0.113* 
     
(0.70) 
 
(0.67) 
     
(-6.47) 
 
(-6.42) 
     
(1.87) 
 
(1.75) 
                        No. Obs. 242 
 
241 
 
225 
 
224 
 
188 
 
187 
 
176 
 
175 
 
53 
 
54 
 
45 
 
44 
Adj. R-sq 0.468 
 
0.411 
 
0.663 
 
0.640 
 
0.568 
 
0.548 
 
0.766 
 
0.764 
 
0.300 
 
0.315 
 
0.574 
 
0.549 
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Table 13: Impact of upside and downside risk on IRR 
This table shows the relationship among IRR, intra-fund volatility, skewness, downside volatility and upside volatility. The table shows the results for all funds, US 
funds and non-US funds. The dependent variable is the IRR of funds. All the variables are defined in Appendix Table 1. Diff. Coeff. gives the difference (in absolute 
terms) of the coefficients for Upside Vol and Downside Vol., and t-Value Diff. reports the value of the corresponding t-test. We include dummies for vintage year 
of current fund and previous fund in our regressions. ***,**,* are significant level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
  All funds 
 
US funds 
 
Non-US funds 
 
Models 
 
Models 
 
Models 
 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
  BO BO BO VC VC VC 
 
BO BO BO VC VC VC 
 
BO BO BO VC VC VC 
Intra-F Vol 0.034*** 0.026** 
 
0.151*** 0.157*** 
  
0.020 0.030 
 
0.145*** 0.152*** 
  
0.038*** 0.022* 
 
0.018 -0.009 
 
 
(3.72) (2.42) 
 
(8.95) (7.46) 
  
(1.19) (1.58) 
 
(6.12) (15.16) 
  
(3.31) (1.68) 
 
(1.10) (-0.40) 
 
                     
Skewness 
 
0.013 
  
-0.005 
   
-0.007 
  
-0.004 
   
0.031** 
  
0.045** 
 
  
(1.54) 
  
(-0.64) 
   
(-0.61) 
  
(-0.45) 
   
(2.54 
  
(2.48) 
 
                     
Downside Vol 
  
-0.359*** 
  
-0.227*** 
   
-0.268*** 
  
-0.360*** 
   
-0.343*** 
  
-0.165 
   
(-6.05) 
  
(-3.23) 
   
(-2.93) 
  
(-4.55) 
   
(-4.79) 
  
(-1.12) 
                     
Upside Vol 
  
0.049*** 
  
0.149*** 
   
0.0335** 
  
0.150*** 
   
0.264*** 
  
0.022 
   
(5.86) 
  
(10.75) 
   
(2.17) 
  
(9.01) 
   
(8.57) 
  
(1.37) 
                     
No. Obs. 389 383 392 376 370 375 
 
148 147 149 272 269 273 
 
241 236 242 102 100 100 
Adj. R-sq 0.279 0.274 0.380 0.659 0.654 0.682 
 
0.485 0.477 0.512 0.706 0.708 0.772 
 
0.263 0.279 0.809 0.436 0.392 0.422 
Diff. Coeff.   0.310***   0.078    0.235**   0.210***    0.079   0.143 
t-Value Diff.   (5.17)   (1.09)    (2.53)   (2.59)    (1.01)   (0.97) 
50 
 
 
Table 14: Impact of legal conditions 
This table shows the impact of the fund's country characteristics on performance and risk persistence. Panel A shows the results of the performance 
persistence for buyout funds (measured by PME), Panel B for VC funds (measured by PME) and Panel C shows the results of risk persistence for both buyout 
and VC funds (measured by Intra-F Volt).  All the variables are defined in Appendix Table 1. We include dummies for vintage year of current fund and 
previous fund in our regressions. ***,**,* are significant level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 Panel A: Buyout funds Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4   Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 
Dep.Var. = PME 
  
Dep.Var. = PME 
PME t-1 0.117** 0.117** 0.113** 0.114** 
  
0.080 0.083 0.081 0.077 
Upside Vol 
    
  
0.072*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.082*** 
Downside Vol 
    
  
-0.639*** -0.649*** -0.628*** -0.617*** 
Anti-director Rights 0.018 -0.042 -0.012 -0.006 
  
-0.003 -0.0640* -0.045 -0.029 
English Legal Origin  -0.132 
   
  
-0.070 
   
Creditor Rights  -0.006 
   
  
-0.006 
   
Public Enforcement Index 
 
-0.038 
  
  
 
0.120 
  
Efficiency of the Judiciary 
 
0.032 0.040* 0.035 
  
 
0.033 0.035 0.037* 
Disclosure Requirements Index 
  
-0.281 
 
  
  
-0.025 
 
Burden of Proof 
   
-0.248* 
  
   
-0.108 
     
  
    
No. Obs. 286 286 286 286 
  
286 286 286 286 
Adj. R-sq 0.072 0.050 0.055 0.070   0.326 0.326 0.327 0.351 
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Table 14 continues 
 Panel B: VC funds 
    
  
    
     
  
    
PME t-1 0.190*** 0.183*** 0.179*** 0.179*** 
  
0.127** 0.097* 0.108** 0.109** 
Upside Vol 
    
  
0.179*** 0.178*** 0.173*** 0.172*** 
Downside Vol 
    
  
-0.719*** -0.698*** -0.721*** -0.700*** 
Anti-director Rights 0.069 0.085 -0.084 -0.062 
  
-0.008 0.110 0.033 -0.009 
English Legal Origin  -0.185 
   
  
0.131 
   
Creditor Rights  -0.044 
   
  
0.011 
   
Public Enforcement Index 
 
-0.257 
  
  
 
-0.536 
  
Efficiency of the Judiciary 
 
0.014 0.022 0.002 
  
 
0.001 0.041 0.028 
Disclosure Requirements Index 
  
0.871 
 
  
  
-0.158 
 
Burden of Proof 
   
0.432 
  
   
0.098 
     
  
    
No. Obs. 247 247 247 247 
  
247 247 247 247 
Adj. R-sq 0.417 0.407 0.403 0.403   0.548 0.570 0.551 0.547 
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Table 14 continues 
 
Buyout funds 
 
 
VC funds 
 Panel C: Buyout and VC funds Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4   
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
Dep. Var. = Intra-F Vol 
 
 
Dep. Var. = Intra-F Vol 
Intra-F Vol t-1 0.149*** 0.151*** 0.149*** 0.145*** 
 
 
0.211*** 0.169*** 0.154** 0.173*** 
Anti-director Rights -0.071 -0.062 -0.080 -0.054 
 
 
-0.023 -0.097 -0.191 -0.094 
English Legal Origin  0.139 
    
 
0.202 
   
Creditor Rights  -0.035 
    
 
-0.074 
   
Public Enforcement Index 
 
0.387 
   
 
 
0.299 
  
Efficiency of the Judiciary 
 
-0.011 -0.027 -0.017 
 
 
 
0.376*** 0.359*** 0.342*** 
Disclosure Requirements Index 
  
0.564 
  
 
  
1.055 
 
Burden of Proof 
   
0.251 
 
 
   
0.243 
      
 
    
No. Obs. 279 279 279 279 
 
 
242 242 242 242 
Adj. R-sq 0.270 0.269 0.270 0.267 
 
 
0.440 0.508 0.514 0.508 
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Table 15: Impact of fund-level characteristics 
This table shows the impact of fund characteristics on performance and risk persistence for buyout and VC investments. All the variables are defined in 
Appendix Table 1. We include dummies for vintage year of current fund and previous fund in our regressions. ***,**,* are significant level at 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively. 
 
 
Buyout funds 
  
VC funds 
  Model 1 Model 2 
 
Model 3 
  
Model 4 Model 5 
 
Model 6 
 
Dep.Var. = PME 
 
Dep. Var. = Intr-F Vol 
  
Dep.Var. = PME 
 
Dep. Var. = Intra-F Vol 
   
 
 
  
  
 
 
PME t-1 0.093* 0.052 
 
 
  
0.165*** 0.090* 
 
 
Intra-F Vol t-1 
  
 
0.161*** 
  
  
 
0.218*** 
Upside  Vol 
 
0.088*** 
 
 
  
 
0.194*** 
 
 
Downside  Vol 
 
-0.647*** 
 
 
  
 
-0.674*** 
 
 
Fund Size -0.036* -0.039* 
 
0.005 
  
0.015 -0.029 
 
0.078 
PE Experience 0.004 0.004 
 
0.009 
  
0.008 0.012* 
 
-0.003 
Propensity to Invest Cross-Border 0.129* 0.062 
 
0.032 
  
-0.033 0.014 
 
-0.182 
Propensity to Sit on Boards 0.138* 0.161* 
 
0.104 
  
-0.107 -0.110 
 
0.032 
Propensity to Syndicate 0.039 -0.007 
 
0.134 
  
0.151* 0.151* 
 
0.026 
Propensity to Stage 
  
 
 
  
-0.171* -0.252* 
 
-0.049 
   
 
 
  
  
 
 
No. Obs. 287 287 
 
279 
  
247 247 
 
241 
Adj. R-sq 0.065 0.250  0.297   0.417 0.603  0.430 
 
54 
 
 
Appendix Table 1: Variable Definitions 
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Variable Definition  
IRR Internal rate of return (IRR) of a fund (or portfolio company) investment calculated using information of the investment 
cash flows. 
Multiple Total-Value-to-Paid-In (TVPI) multiple of a fund (or portfolio company) investment.  
PME Public Market Equivalent of a fund investment. We calculate PME using the approach proposed by Kaplan and Schoar 
(2005). The S&P 500 Index is used to proxy for the public market for US funds and main national indices are used for all 
non-US funds. 
Fund Size Fund Size is measured as the natural logarithm of the fund's total invested capital in US dollars. 
Intra-F Vol Intra-fund volatility measures the standard deviation of IRRs of the individual portfolio company investments made by 
a fund. It proxies for the total risk of a fund (see also the formal definition in Section 2.2). 
Downside Vol Downside volatility measures the downside standard deviation of IRRs of individual portfolio company investments 
made by a fund. It proxies for the downside risk of a fund (see also the formal definition in Section 2.2).  
Upside Vol Upside volatility measures the upside standard deviation of IRRs of individual portfolio company investments made by 
a fund. It proxies for the upside potential of a fund (see also the formal definition in Section 2.2). 
Sharpe Ratio  Sharpe ratio measures the return earned by a fund in excess of the risk-free rate per unit of total risk. In order to 
calculate the Sharpe ratios of the sample funds, we use fund IRRs and proxy total risk by using the intra-fund 
volatilities. 
Sortino Ratio The Sortino ratio measures the return earned by a fund in excess of the risk-free rate per unit of downside risk. In order 
to calculate the Sortino ratios of the sample funds, we use fund IRRs and proxy downside risk by using the downside 
volatilities. 
Skewness Measures the skewness of IRRs of the individual portfolio company investments made by a fund. 
  
PE Experience  The fund's sequence number of the management firm. 
Propensity to Invest Cross-Border The fraction of the portfolio company investments of a fund that are cross-border deals. 
Propensity to Sit on Boards The fraction of the done deals in which the fund held a board seat relative to the fund's total number of deals. 
Propensity to Syndicate The fraction of the done deals that are syndicated relative to the fund's total number of deals. 
Propensity to Stage The average number of rounds a given PE fund invests in portfolio companies (based on all investments made). 
Anti-director Rights An index taking a value from 0 for less rights to 5 for more rights offered to shareholders of a publicly listed company in 
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the country of the fund. (Source:  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2006) 
English Legal Origin A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the fund is located in a country that has a common law legal origin and 0 
otherwise. (Source:  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2006) 
Creditor Rights AŶŝŶĚĞǆĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚŝŶŐĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ ?ƌŝŐŚƚƐŝŶƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇŽĨƚŚĞĨƵŶĚĂŶĚƚĂŬĞƐĂǀĂůƵĞĨƌŽŵ ? ?ǁĞĂŬĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐƌŝŐŚts) to 4 
 ?ƐƚƌŽŶŐĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ ?ƌŝŐŚƚ ? ?  (Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998) 
Public Enforcement Index An index taking a value from 0 (less) to 1 (more) that represents the level of public enforcement of securities laws in 
the country of the fund. It is calculated as the arithmetic average of supervisor, investigative, orders and criminals.  
(Source:  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2006) 
Efficiency of the Judiciary An index ranging from 0 (less) to 10 (more) indicating how efficient the legal system is in the country of the fund.  
(Source:  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2006) 
Disclosure Requirements Index An index ranging from 0 (less) to 1 (more) and measures the extent of disclosure requirements in a prospectus in the 
country of the fund.  (Source:  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2006) 
Burden of Proof An index ranging from 0 (less) to 1 (more) and measures how difficult it is for a shareholder to recover damages from a 
company in the country of the fund.  (Source:  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2006) 
